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Introduction 
 From August through November of 2011 I worked as an intern for the Utah 
Democratic state party at their state party headquarters.  I started my internship around 
the same time as the newly elected chair of the state party, Jim Dabakis, assumed his new 
role as head of the party.  Dabakis did not have the traditional resume of a party chair but 
rather had his background as an international art dealer and businessman.  He had always 
been politically minded and involved in political causes, but he did not have the extensive 
partisan politics background that previous chairs had.  In anticipation of taking over as 
chair, Dabakis went on a statewide tour visiting with all of the county party leaders and 
Utahns from all over the state.  When I started my internship Dabakis expressed that he 
was somewhat perplexed as to why the party was organized in the way that it was.  He 
didn’t understand why each of twenty-nine counties needed its own county party with its 
own executive committee and its own bureaucratic structure.  I realized that, despite my 
background in political science, I had never really thought about this question and had no 
idea whether there even were state parties that were organized in any other way.  I began 
to ask the same questions as Dabakis.  Certainly Salt Lake County, with over one million 
people living within its boundaries, needs its own county party structure but is the same 
necessarily true for Daggett or Piute counties that each has less than two thousand 
residents? If Utah has such a great contrast between counties creating confusion in 
organizational structure, then it is likely that other states have some unique organizational 
needs as well.  
This confusion over the decentralization of party power to the county level rather 
than some other sub-level spurred several questions.  Do parties organize themselves in 
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any other way below the state level in other states? If so, what is the reasoning behind the 
model of decentralization chosen in various states? Further, if a party chooses a different 
model of decentralization of state party organization what impact, if any, does this have 
on electoral success, candidate recruitment, party organizational strength, registration 
numbers, and other indicators of party success? These questions not only have theoretical 
grounding, but the answers to these questions have real life application to partisan politics 
in modern electoral politics in the United States. This paper will conduct a review of 
literature relating to party integration, summarize the hierarchical organizational 
structures of the various state parties, examine potential causes and potential 
consequences of various structure models, and provide a review of surveys and 
interviews of local party elites to provide useful insight into the aforementioned 
questions. 
 
Existing Literature 
What are Parties? 
 Before being able to address the issue of how and why parties choose to organize 
themselves on multiple levels, it is necessary to understand what parties are and how they 
are conceptualized.  For some, the concept of political parties revolves around the idea 
that a group of individuals coalesce into a team in order to attain elected office to enjoy 
the power, prestige, and financial benefits that controlling the government structure can 
provide to those in charge.  Further these individuals within this coalition known as a 
party behave rationally in order to proceed “toward its goals with a minimal use of scarce 
resources and undertakes only those actions for which marginal return exceeds marginal 
cost” (Downs, 1957, p. 137).  Somewhat similarly,  Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and 
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Huckshorn (1989) based their comprehensive study on American parties on the idea that: 
“political parties may be conceived in terms of symbols...or as cognitions in the minds of 
voters...or as teams of candidates...but they must also be considered as organizations” 
(Cotter et al., 1989, p. 3).  For Cotter and his associates, parties as organizations work to 
control the party image and presence on the ballot, to exploit, manipulate, or otherwise 
engage a portion of the electorate to identify with the party, and elect candidates the party 
has nominated for electoral office.  In order to elect candidates, parties realize they must 
appeal to political independents and those weakly associated to the other party in order to 
build large enough coalitions for electoral success.  Carty (2004) argues that in order to 
have the flexibility to build such coalitions in modern campaigns, parties as organizations 
are now a more flexible and fluid entity rather than a rigid structure of party bosses 
making top down decisions that they expect all candidates on the ballot at all levels to 
abide by. 
 Schlesinger (1984) attempts to define parties by their behavior and by the factors 
that drive this behavior.  Schlesinger notes that parties operate in a political market and 
their behavior is driven by performing political functions and responding to 
psychological needs of the electorate and as a result, parties do the things they do “as by-
products of the pursuit of their goals” to be successful in that electoral market.  The 
elections as a political market foundation is important for Schlesinger’s examination of 
parties and he views parties as organizations as any other business operating within the 
market: 
 
“Just as a business can maintain itself by selling its product at an adequate 
price, a party able to win office has no difficulty in obtaining all the 
elements of a vital organization: attractive candidates, willing workers, 
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and money givers. And, just as the economic market sends clear and 
unambiguous messages to the business firm concerning the success or 
failure of its product, the political market evaluates openly, automatically, 
externally, and with exquisite numerical precision the output of the 
political party” (Schlesinger, 1984, p.381). 
 
As such, it appears Schlesinger is making an argument to define parties as organizations 
that behave like any other business or enterprise that operates in a political and electoral 
marketplace instead of a commodity based market.  However, Schlesinger is careful to 
note that “Students of parties have never even come to an agreement on what a political 
party is, much less on how to tell whether one is strong or weak, decaying or blossoming” 
(Schlesinger, 1984, p.371).  However, for the purposes for this examination I shall define 
political parties as organizations with internal rules and structures that aim to promote 
certain policies, gain power within the government, and inspire loyalty and a party 
“brand” among voters (Hershey 2011).   
Party Success 
 Since the days of the renowned political scientist V.O. Key, scholars have 
traditionally evaluated political parties as tripartite entities consisting of the party in the 
electorate, the party in government, and the party as an organization.  The party in the 
electorate is the party label under which voters identify and view themselves as members 
of the party in their political and electoral civic activities.  The party in government 
consists of the elected officials in government offices that are members of the party.  The 
party as an organization refers to the party staff, physical facilities, bylaws and rules, and 
other organizational characteristics (Edwards III, Wattenberg, Lineberry 2005).  This 
section of the paper will examine how the relative success of political parties is measured 
and analyzed.  While all three elements of parties—in the electorate, in government, and 
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as an organization—can be isolated and studied for a party’s success and efficiency in 
that particular element, it is important to remember that all elements of the party impact 
and are themselves impacted by the other elements of the party and any successes or 
shortfalls in a singular element will likely have a corresponding impact on the other 
elements and thereby on the party as a whole. 
As discussed previously, parties work to achieve some level of electoral success 
and party identification with a portion of the electorate, but in terms of success some 
scholars argue that “success” of a party organization is relative to the circumstances and 
climate in which it operates:  
 
“The ultimate electoral objective of a party is not to maximize the number 
of people who express an attitudinal preference for it but, rather, to be able 
to contest elections effectively. Depending on the existing partisan 
context, this long-range objective may be pursued by different tactical 
approaches. For  example,  in  areas  of  one-party dominance the minority 
party may follow a long-term developmental approach that includes 
establishing a  token presence, developing a cadre of local activists, and 
gradually recruiting (or converting) credible candidates” (Frendreis et al, 
1990, p.227). 
 
Stokes (1999) follows this line of thought in arguing that successful parties are able to 
fully capitalize on electoral mandates and responsively address the political and 
psychological needs of the median voter.  This is a key component of party success 
because “party leaders’ policy preferences diverge in the direction of the median voter 
from the more extreme position of activists from their own party” (Stokes, 1999, p.261); 
without the ability to capitalize on activist energy and support while maintaining policy 
positions that appeal to independent voters parties will not meet their maximum electoral 
potential. 
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 Cotter and his colleagues assess party success through its organizational strength 
by examining attributes such as budget, professional staff, party officers, institutional 
support, and candidate directed programs.  A sufficient budget and professional, 
competent staff allows a party the organizational strength and stability to develop and 
carry out various programs.  Institutional support provides durability and continuity 
which enables the party to court voters, sway public opinions over time, and influence 
events and interests outside the party organization itself.  Cotter and his associates further 
indicate that a state party’s organizational strength is developed through its relations with 
both the national party above it, and local parties below it.  The extent to which the state 
party coordinates with local parties on tasks ranging from candidate recruitment to 
fundraising are an indication of the party’s strength as an organization, while not 
necessarily an indicator of electoral success: 
 
“Perhaps the most significant implication of all this is that state party 
organizations can be maintained and increased in their organizational 
strength through elements of their association with the national party 
organization, and in the apparent absence of supporting trends in the other 
components of party:  the party-in-the-electorate and the party-in-
government” (Cotter et al., 1989, p.72). 
 
Through organizational strength, Cotter et al. hypothesize that parties achieve greater 
success in recruiting quality candidates since they “assume party organizations are 
committed to electoral competition and election winning,” and therefore “the capacity of 
the party to function in a competitive electoral system is conditioned to a significant 
degree on the range and quality of candidates running under the party label” (Cotter et al., 
1989, p. 7). 
 Building on the extensive work by Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshorn, 
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Coleman (1996) argues that party organizational strength impacts the linkage between 
voters and parties and voters’ perceptions of parties in the electoral process.  When both 
parties in an area operate somewhat competitively with one another, the organizational 
strength of the parties strengthens their linkage to voters and voters’ opinions of parties in 
general are more positive.  Conversely, Coleman finds that “if one party's organizational 
presence is far stronger than the other's, the public may perceive a power imbalance, and 
this imbalance may be viewed negatively” (Coleman, 1996, p.809).  When the 
organizational strength between the parties in an area diverges creating an organizational 
strength gap, it harms public perception of parties and weakens their impact on, and trust 
from, the electorate: 
“Supportive attitudes will more likely flourish where there is not too great 
a gap between the organizational condition of the two major parties: if one 
party alone builds power, critical responses increase. Americans are more 
approving of parties as institutions when their experience is with 
competitive party organization” (Coleman, 1996, p.815). 
 
Coleman asserts that Americans are culturally averse to absolute power and power 
imbalances as seen through the great lengths the framers of the Constitution took to 
create safeguards through separation of powers and other efforts implemented since the 
founding era such as the implementation of term limits that seek to prevent power from 
becoming too concentrated in one group, person, or place.   
Thus while a political party is not a governmental entity, Americans hold similar 
distrust of extreme power imbalances and while they may continue to vote in ways that 
uphold one party dominance in a state or area, their view of parties generally is more 
unfavorable which in turn weakens the strength of parties as organizations (Coleman, 
1996).  
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State and Local Party Differences 
 Just as the state-wide parties differ from the national party, so too do local party 
units differ from the state party.  In order to investigate why parties choose to organize 
themselves in different ways below the state level, it is useful to provide a foundation of 
how state and local parties differ in general.  State parties are more bureaucratically 
structured with professional staff and more experienced officers and a full time party 
chair or executive director while local parties are less bureaucratic and more interpersonal 
(Cotter et al., 1989).  Local parties use their more personal nature to conduct more direct 
campaign activities such as voter registration efforts and direct involvement in the 
campaigns of candidates where their involvement “begins with candidate recruitment, 
extends through the primary, and continues during the general election” (Frendreis et al., 
1990, p. 227).   
Because local parties operate on a more personal, grassroots type level of political 
engagement they are more responsive to the local wants and needs and therefore the more 
local a unit of the party is, the more credibility it generally enjoys from the electorate 
(Houten, 2009).  Further, when the goals of the sub-units of the party diverge from those 
of the higher levels of the party, it could be that they are responding to pressure from 
local constituencies that do not align with the desires of the wider party or it could be due 
to the opportunity to mobilize local interests on issues that are specific to their local sub-
unit jurisdiction (Thorlakson, 2010, p. 7). 
Party Integration and Interaction 
 Now that we have an idea of what constitutes political parties, what measures 
their success and contributes explanation to their behavior, and how they differ at 
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different sub-national and sub-state levels, we must now address how state-level parties 
interact and integrate—or don’t integrate should that be the case—with the sub-units of 
their party within their state.  Reviewing literature of how parties integrate and interact 
will provide a foundation for the future exploration of why and how parties choose to 
decentralize in the manner they do and the impacts this has on their success and 
organizational strength.  In order for scholars to evaluate how various levels of a party 
interact they must have a framework for analysis:  
 
“What is required is a framework for thinking about party structures that 
identifies the autonomy of their various parts as a defining feature while 
recognizing the integral character of the organization as a whole, and 
allows us to explore how individual parties operationalize and 
institutionalize the stratarchical imperative in form and practice” (Carty, 
2004, p.7). 
 
It is important to remember that parties aren’t rigid robotic mechanisms, but rather the 
various structures within parties are autonomous organizations that piece together to form 
the party organization as a whole.  The more that these autonomous parts within a party 
work cohesively and function fluidly together, the more the party is said to be an 
integrated party.  Integrated parties share the same party label and therefore “the two 
levels of the party share a common goal and loyalty to the party as a whole...so that every 
component part of the party contributes to the party’s overall success” (Thorlakson, 2010, 
p. 3).   
 In studying how various units of political parties integrate and work around and 
with one another, scholars have tried to identify various factors that push a party towards 
or away from more integration with local units.  Cotter and his colleagues set out to 
examine whether party integration between state and local parties impacted the 
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organizational strength at either level.  They initially thought that an integration of state 
and local units that brought strength to one would result in greater organizational strength 
at both levels, but instead found that “it generally seems that the factors causing state and 
local party organizational strength are dissimilar” (Cotter et al, 1989, p.51).  Perhaps 
integration between state and local party units relies upon the strength and stability of the 
state party before it feels sufficiently secure to integrate: 
 
“For state parties of intermediate strength, increments in strength are not 
associated with increments in integration, suggesting the diversion of state 
party resources to other purposes.  At relatively high levels of strength the 
pattern changes again.  Perhaps only as state party organizations become 
secure in their own strength are they willing to siphon off resources and 
effort towards relating with the local parties” (Cotter et al, 1989, p.75). 
 
The data collected and examined by Cotter and his co-authors found that for the 
Democrats, increments of integration resulted in increased party organizational strength 
on the local level, but such a hypothesis was completely unsupported by the data 
concerning the Republican party and therefore likely had more to do with party culture 
and the regions of each party’s strongholds rather than some universal truth equating 
improvements in integration with greater organizational strength for local units. 
 Roscoe and Jenkins (2009) attempted a brief examination of the impact of inter-
party competition on integration between state and local party units.  From their sample, 
the two states with the most balanced party competition showed the largest scores of their 
party integration index while the two states with the most one sided, one party dominance 
produced the lowest scores indicating that “party competition clearly seems to be 
influencing the degree of state and local party coordination on activities” (Roscoe & 
Jenkins, 2009, p. 13).  They note that in states where one political party enjoys electoral 
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dominance local parties were shown to be less active, less structurally sound, and less 
integrated with the state party.  This is true for both parties—both the majority and 
minority party in that state—but they do concede that the majority party is more active 
than the minority party within a particular state.  The local parties in states with more 
balanced party competition are more structurally sound and found to be more integrated 
with the state party (Roscoe & Jenkins, 2009).  This is in line with the earlier findings of 
Cotter et al. such that when local parties are more structurally vibrant and self supportive, 
it is less of a burden and drain on state party resources to integrate and involve itself with 
local parties and therefore state parties feel more “secure in their own strength” and 
“willing to siphon off resources and effort towards relating with the local parties” (Cotter 
et al, 1989, p.75).  These results support the Downsian argument that parties are a 
coalition of individuals seeking the power and prestige of elected office and use parties as 
vehicles to invest scarce resources to maximize returns in order to achieve greater chance 
of electoral success.   
 Roscoe and Jenkins (2011) follow up their 2009 work by investigating several 
hypotheses that work to explain levels of state and local party integration within the 
context of inter-party electoral competition.  They first advance the “good dog” 
hypothesis which holds that state parties are very strategic in their decisions concerning 
cooperation and assistance to local party units because the state party has limited 
resources.  This good dog hypothesis argues that in order to best manage these limited 
resources, state party leaders calculate any assistance or cooperation with local party 
units as an investment of scarce resources and will evaluate local organizations on the 
basis of the potential dividends and payoffs of such an investment.  This results in a 
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climate wherein “local  committees  with  mature  organizational structures and an 
already established repertoire of electoral activity will seem like good bets...[l]ike  good 
 dogs  getting  a treat,  good  local  committees  are  likely  to  be  rewarded  by  the  state 
committees” (Roscoe & Jenkins, 2011, p. 5).  This line of thinking in the good dog 
hypothesis follows the Downsian thinking about parties that argues that the coalition of 
individuals that make up party units only behave in a manner that advances their goals of 
attaining electoral success and will only undertake actions that produce a good 
“investment” with returns exceeding costs.  
 A second hypothesis—the “scrappy fighter hypothesis”—evaluates the situation 
differently.  Under this view, those state parties that suffer under unfavorable prevailing 
political conditions are more likely to fight harder to try and make up the difference 
through increased effort and will do anything, including assisting and cooperating with 
local party committees, to scrap and claw its way to electoral relevance.  If the scrappy 
fighter hypothesis were to hold true: 
 
“We [would] expect state parties that are disadvantaged by the political 
context of the state will act like scrappy fighters and make greater efforts 
to assist and cooperate with local party committees.  Democratic  parties 
 in  red  states,  for  instance,  should  be  better  integrated  than  those  in 
 blue states.  Similarly,  parties  in  counties  that  are  unfavorable  to 
 their  electoral  success  may  also fight like mad using state assistance ” 
(Roscoe & Jenkins, 2011, p.4). 
 
The results of their study showed that the scrappy fighter hypothesis was supported by 
the data collected from their sample.  A political party’s proportion of the seats within the 
state legislature has a negative relationship with the party’s level of integration between 
state and local units of the party.  This is consistent with the scrappy fighter hypothesis 
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where we see that minority parties within the state are working more closely with their 
county and local party units than the opposition party that enjoys comfortable margins in 
elected officials in the state legislature: “State ideology is negatively correlated with state 
party assistance to the county parties, providing support for the scrappy fighter 
hypothesis.  State parties in more hostile environments seem to be working with their 
county parties more in order to turn the political tide” (Roscoe & Jenkins, 2011, p.16).   
The scrappy fighter hypothesis however only relates to electoral competition at 
the state level as Roscoe and Jenkins found no correlation between integration between 
state and local units and the level of partisan competition at the county or local level 
seeming to suggest that the needs of the state party drive the decisions relating to 
integration regardless of the needs of the local party units.  This is intuitive as the state 
party is more likely to have greater—although they would argue, still limited and 
scarce—resources to invest in local party units than county or local units would have to 
invest towards state-level activities.  The leadership controlling the resources seeking to 
maximize their own marginal returns is the leadership that drives the bus on the highway 
towards, or away from, integration and cooperation with other units of the party. 
On the basis of this research by Roscoe and Jenkins, one would expect that if the 
“good dog” hypothesis is true then state parties will only maintain intermediary party 
organizations insofar as they are viewed as a valuable electoral investment.  Further, 
while their results on the “scrappy fighter” hypothesis did not hold for county and local 
electoral success, state parties may still maintain intermediary or other party 
organizations that may be viewed as organizationally superfluous if the party feels it is at 
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a political or cultural disadvantage and that these intermediary organizations will help to 
overcome such a disadvantage. 
Summary of Hierarchical Organizational Models 
In order to address questions surrounding why parties organize themselves the 
way they do and what the impacts of these hierarchical organizational structures include 
it is necessary to outline the various forms of organizations that state parties have chosen 
to organize below the state level.  Using party documents—namely the party bylaws and 
constitutions—collected from the Democratic and Republican parties from each state I 
was able to create a breakdown by state and party of how state parties organize 
themselves below their statewide organizations.  I was able to find the necessary 
information for the Democratic and Republican parties from each state with the exception 
of the Republican Party of Washington state.  After repeated emails, phone calls, and an 
exhaustive search of their website I was still unable to obtain the necessary information to 
include them in the sample.  I specifically looked to see if any state parties indicated they 
had changed their structural organization recently in order to see if there were before and 
after results which we could examine to help determine the electoral impact of 
hierarchical structural organizational models.  I was unable to find an instance of a state 
party changing models in the last thirty years.   
Roughly half (48 out of 99 state parties) of the organizations have a hierarchical 
structure that decentralizes directly from the state to the county level party 
organizations—or the parish level in the case of the state of Louisiana.  Forty-one state 
parties have committees and party organizations between the state and county levels 
which are based on the US House congressional districts within the state.  These 
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congressional district parties differ across states with some states having active, involved 
congressional district parties that have officers, offices, websites, and other mechanisms 
of activity while other states’ congressional district parties are merely a committee within 
the party structure and play much less of an active role.   
The handful of remaining state parties each have their own unique structures.  The 
Republican and Democratic parties in Alaska and North Dakota do not organize on the 
congressional district level (both states only have one US House member and thus a 
congressional district organization would be the direct overlap of a state organization), 
and neither do they organize on the county level, but rather these state parties 
decentralize themselves into party organizations on either the state house or state senate 
level.  The state parties of Delaware, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have their own 
quirky hierarchical structures.  The parties in Delaware operate on a hybrid county and 
region structure to fully meet the needs of the state’s small number of counties with dense 
populations in certain areas.  The Democratic party of Delaware has organizations for 
City of Wilmington, New Castle County, Kent County, and Sussex County while the 
Republican party in the state uses organizations in each of the state’s three counties as 
well as a regional organization it created for the Newark region.  In Massachusetts both 
parties skip any intermediary organizations and organize on the town, city, or ward level 
below the state organization and similarly the parties in Rhode Island operate city and 
town organizations without organizations on a county or regional level. 
There are only three states in which the bylaws and constitutions of the 
Democratic and Republican parties differ in the required hierarchical structures outlined 
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in these party documents.  In Colorado the Democratic Party uses the congressional 
district organization model while the Republican Party uses the county organization 
model.  The same thing is seen in Louisiana where the Democrats have a congressional 
district party organization above the parish (county) level, whereas the Republicans go 
directly to the parish level.  Conversely, it is the Republican Party in South Carolina that 
uses the congressional district model while the Democrats utilize the county 
organizational structure.  The following figures display visually the type of hierarchical 
structure chosen by state parties in each state. 
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Party Hierarchical Organization By State
Congressional District
County 
State House/Senate
Other Local Units
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Congressional District County State House/Senate Other Local Units
Alabama Arizona Alaska Delaware
Arkansas California North Dakota Massachusetts
Colorado (Dem) Colorado (Rep) Rhode Island
Connecticut Florida
Georgia Hawaii
Indiana Idaho
Iowa Illinois
Kansas Louisiana (Rep)
Kentucky Maryland
Louisiana (Dem) Mississippi
Maine Montana
Michigan Nevada
Minnesota New Hampshire
Missouri New Jersey
Nebraska New Mexico
North Carolina New York
Oklahoma Ohio
Oregon Pennsylvania
South Carolina (Rep) South Carolina (Dem)
Virginia South Dakota
West Virginia Tennessee
Wisconsin Texas
Utah
Vermont
Washington (Dem)
Wyoming  
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Potential Causes 
 Now that it has been determined how state parties organize themselves below the 
state level, it is necessary to explore the potential causes that might lead a state party to 
choose one model of organization over another.  This section will cover potential causes 
such as state size in terms of both population and geography, the number of congressional 
districts, the number of counties, the urbanization and population density of the state, 
intra-party homogeneity of the party within the state, and potential geographic regional 
factors. 
Population 
 The overall population of a state could potentially impact the hierarchical 
structure chosen by state parties.  States with larger populations will have more 
congressional districts and therefore parties may choose to utilize a congressional district 
model to decentralize party activity rather than a county model.  However, according to 
the 2010 US Census population numbers, the seven most populous states—and the only 
seven states in the nation with more than fifteen house districts—all utilize the county 
model of party organization.  When examining the rankings of states by population when 
we look at roughly the middle third of the states in the rankings—states ranging from 
four to eight US House districts—it is revealed that 25 of the 36 state parties in these 
states utilize the congressional district model.  This means that 25 of the 41 state parties 
(roughly 61%) that employ the congressional district model are located in the middle 
third of states in the population rankings.  The following table displays the rankings of 
states by population according to the 2010 census and their corresponding hierarchical 
organizational structure:  
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Rank State 2010 Census Population Congressional Districts Organizational Structure
1 California 37,253,956 53 County
2 Texas 25,145,561 36 County
3 New York 19,378,102 27 County
4 Florida 18,801,310 27 County
5 Illinois 12,830,632 18 County
6 Pennsylvania 12,702,379 18 County
7 Ohio 11,536,504 16 County
8 Michigan 9,883,640 14 Congressional District
9 Georgia 9,687,653 14 Congressional District
10 North Carolina 9,535,483 13 Congressional District
11 New Jersey 8,791,894 12 County
12 Virginia 8,001,024 11 Congressional District
13 Washington 6,724,540 10 County (Dem)
14 Massachusetts 6,547,629 9 Town/Ward/City
15 Indiana 6,483,802 9 Congressional District
16 Arizona 6,392,017 9 County
17 Tennessee 6,346,105 9 County
18 Missouri 5,988,927 8 Congressional District
19 Maryland 5,773,552 8 County
20 Wisconsin 5,686,986 8 Congressional District
21 Minnesota 5,303,925 8 Congressional District
22 Colorado 5,029,196 7 Congressional Dist (Dem), County (Rep)
23 Alabama 4,779,736 7 Congressional District
24 South Carolina 4,625,364 7 County (Dem), Congressional Dist (Rep)
25 Louisiana 4,533,372 6 Congressional Dist (Dem), County (Rep)
26 Kentucky 4,339,367 6 Congressional District
27 Oregon 3,831,074 5 Congressional District
28 Oklahoma 3,751,351 5 Congressional District
29 Connecticut 3,574,097 5 Congressional District
30 Iowa 3,046,355 4 Congressional District
31 Mississippi 2,967,297 4 County
32 Arkansas 2,915,918 4 Congressional District
33 Kansas 2,853,118 4 Congressional District
34 Utah 2,763,885 4 County
35 Nevada 2,700,551 4 County
36 New Mexico 2,059,179 3 County
37 West Virginia 1,852,994 3 Congressional District
38 Nebraska 1,826,341 3 Congressional District
39 Idaho 1,567,582 2 County
40 Hawaii 1,360,301 2 County
41 Maine 1,328,361 2 Congressional District
42 New Hampshire 1,316,470 2 County
43 Rhode Island 1,052,567 2 City/town
44 Montana 989,415 1 County
45 Delaware 897,934 1 County/Region/City hybrid
46 South Dakota 814,180 1 County
47 Alaska 710,231 1 Legislative District
48 North Dakota 672,591 1 Legislative District
49 Vermont 625,741 1 County
50 Wyoming 563,626 1 County
Source: 2010 Census
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Geographic Size 
 If the larger states in terms of population choose to utilize one model of 
organization more frequently there may also be at trend based on a state’s geographic 
size.  Using the census data figures on the area in square miles of each state and then rank 
ordering the states from largest to smallest we can conduct a cursory assessment of any 
potential relationship between geographic size of a state and the hierarchical structures 
the political parties in that state choose to use.  Of the top 10 states when ranked by total 
area, 15 of the 20 state parties in these states utilize the county model of organization—a 
rate higher than the average across the country but roughly the same as the top 10 largest 
states in population (only two states are in the top 10 in both categories).  In looking at 
the bottom 10 in the rankings of geographic size we find that 11 of the 20 parties use the 
county model which is consistent with the 12 out of 20 state parties that use the county 
model in the bottom 10 in the population rankings—admittedly 5 states are in the bottom 
10 in both the population and geographic size rankings and so we should expect this to 
remain fairly consistent.  
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Rank State Area (sq miles) Organizational Structure
1 Alaska 663,267.26 Legislative District
2 Texas 268,580.82 County
3 California 163,695.57 County
4 Montana 147,042.40 County
5 New Mexico 121,589.48 County
6 Arizona 113,998.30 County
7 Nevada 110,560.71 County
8 Colorado 104,093.57 Congressional District (Dem), County (Rep)
9 Oregon 98,380.64 Congressional District
10 Wyoming 97,813.56 County
11 Michigan 96,716.11 Congressional District
12 Minnesota 86,938.87 Congressional District
13 Utah 84,898.83 County
14 Idaho 83,570.08 County
15 Kansas 82,276.84 Congressional District
16 Nebraska 77,353.73 Congressional District
17 South Dakota 77,116.49 County
18 Washington 71,299.64 County (Dem)
19 North Dakota 70,699.79 Legislative District
20 Oklahoma 69,898.19 Congressional District
21 Missouri 69,704.31 Congressional District
22 Florida 65,754.59 County
23 Wisconsin 65,497.82 Congressional District
24 Georgia 59,424.77 Congressional District
25 Illinois 57,914.38 County
26 Iowa 56,271.55 Congressional District
27 New York 54,556.00 County
28 North Carolina 53,818.51 Congressional District
29 Arkansas 53,178.62 Congressional District
30 Alabama 52,419.02 Congressional District
31 Louisiana 51,839.70 County
32 Mississippi 48,430.19 County
33 Pennsylvania 46,055.24 County
34 Ohio 44,824.90 County
35 Virginia 42,774.20 Congressional District
36 Tennessee 42,143.27 County
37 Kentucky 40,409.02 Congressional District
38 Indiana 36,417.73 Congressional District
39 Maine 35,384.65 Congressional District
40 South Carolina 32,020.20 County (Dem), Congressional District (Rep)
41 West Virginia 24,229.76 Congressional District
42 Maryland 12,406.68 County
43 Hawaii 10,930.98 County
44 Massachusetts 10,554.57 Town/Ward/City
45 Vermont 9,614.26 County
46 New Hampshire 9,349.94 County
47 New Jersey 8,721.30 County
48 Connecticut 5,543.33 Congressional District
49 Delaware 2,489.27 County/City/Region Hybrid
50 Rhode Island 1,545.05 City/Town
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Number of Counties 
 Perhaps a state party’s hierarchical organizational structure isn’t impacted by the 
sheer number of people within a state’s boundaries or by the geographic area the state 
party needs to decentralize to cover.  A state’s population has a direct link to the number 
of congressional districts in the state, but the examination of population and geographic 
area haven’t touched on the number of counties within each state.  A state party in a state 
with a large number of counties may feel it to be efficacious to organize on a 
congressional district level rather than decentralizing directly to the county level—
Georgia, for example, is divided into 159 counties but only has 14 congressional districts.   
There is a wide range in the number of counties per state; Texas has the largest 
number of counties with 254 and Delaware has the fewest counties with 3.  The median 
number of counties for a state is 63 (and the average number of counties is roughly the 
same at 62.6).  When rank ordering states by their number of counties we find that of the 
41 state parties that organize on the congressional district level, 32 (78%) of these parties 
are above the median and average number of counties per state.  Conversely, 30 of the 48 
(63%) state parties that organize on the county level with no congressional district 
organization are located in the bottom 25 in the ranking of states by number of counties. 
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Rank State Counties Organizational Structure
1 Texas 254 County
2 Georgia 159 Congressional District
3 Virginia 134 Congressional District
4 Kentucky 120 Congressional District
5 Missouri 114 Congressional District
6 Kansas 105 Congressional District
7 Illinois 102 County
8 North Carolina 100 Congressional District
9 Iowa 99 Congressional District
10 Tennessee 95 County
11 Nebraska 93 Congressional District
12 Indiana 92 Congressional District
13 Ohio 88 County
14 Minnesota 87 Congressional District
15 Michigan 83 Congressional District
16 Mississippi 82 County
17 Oklahoma 77 Congressional District
18 Arkansas 75 Congressional District
19 Wisconsin 72 Congressional District
20 Pennsylvania 67 County
21 Florida 67 County
22 Alabama 67 Congressional District
23 South Dakota 66 County
24 Louisiana 64 Congressional District (Dem), County (Rep)
25 Colorado 64 Congressional District (Dem), County (Rep)
26 New York 62 County
27 California 58 County
28 Montana 56 County
29 West Virginia 55 Congressional District
30 North Dakota 53 Legislative District
31 South Carolina 46 County (Dem), Congressional District (Rep)
32 Idaho 44 County
33 Washington 39 County (Dem)
34 Oregon 36 Congressional District
35 New Mexico 33 County
36 Utah 29 County
37 Maryland 24 County
38 Wyoming 23 County
39 New Jersey 21 County
40 Alaska 18 Legislative District
41 Nevada 17 County
42 Maine 16 Congressional District
43 Arizona 15 County
44 Vermont 14 County
45 Massachusetts 14 Town/Ward/City
46 New Hampshire 10 County
47 Connecticut 8 Congressional District
48 Rhode Island 5 City/Town
49 Hawaii 5 County
50 Delaware 3 County/City/Region Hybrid
source: National Association of Counties  
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Urban Population 
 Another characteristic of a state that could impact the organizational model its 
state political parties utilize relates to the compactness of its population.  If a state has a 
large population but also a large geographic area in which its population is spread out 
then it stands to reason that state parties in such a state would have different 
organizational needs than a state party in a state with a large but compact population.  
Population density is a popular measurement that tries to capture this idea, but when 
taken across whole states combining dense urban areas and spacious rural areas it can 
render the measurement meaningless and therefore is best left to smaller units such as 
cities.  Instead of population density I decided to use the census statistics for the 
percentage of a state’s population that lives in urban areas to try and address this potential 
cause of hierarchical structure model utilized by state parties. 
 In ranking states in descending order by the percentage of its population that lives 
in urban areas we find that 8 of the top 10 states use the county organizational model with 
the other two using a city or town level structure—meaning that none of the states in the 
top 10 use the congressional district model.  Further, 30 of the 48 (63%) state parties 
using the county model are found in the top half of the urban population rankings while 
29 of the 41 (71%) state parties utilizing the congressional district model are found in the 
bottom half of these rankings.   
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Rank State % pop in urban areas Organizational Structure
1 New Jersey 94.4 County
2 California 94.4 County
3 Hawaii 91.5 County
4 Nevada 91.5 County
5 Massachusetts 91.4 Town/Ward/City
6 Rhode Island 90.9 City/Town
7 Florida 89.3 County
8 Arizona 88.2 County
9 Utah 88.2 County
10 Illinois 87.8 County
11 Connecticut 87.7 Congressional District
12 New York 87.5 County
13 Maryland 86.1 County
14 Colorado 84.5 Congressional District (Dem), County (Rep)
15 Texas 82.5 County
16 Washington 82.0 County (Dem)
17 Delaware 80.1 County/City/Region hybrid
18 Oregon 78.7 Congressional District
19 Ohio 77.4 County
20 Pennsylvania 77.1 County
21 New Mexico 75.0 County
22 Michigan 74.7 Congressional District
23 Virginia 73.0 Congressional District
24 Louisiana 72.6 Congressional District (Dem), County (Rep)
25 Georgia 71.6 Congressional District
26 Kansas 71.4 Congressional District
27 Minnesota 70.9 Congressional District
28 Indiana 70.8 Congressional District
29 Nebraska 69.8 Congressional District
30 Missouri 69.4 Congressional District
31 Wisconsin 68.3 Congressional District
32 Idaho 66.4 County
33 Alaska 65.6 Legislative District
34 Oklahoma 65.3 Congressional District
35 Wyoming 65.1 County
36 Tennessee 63.6 County
37 Iowa 61.1 Congressional District
38 South Carolina 60.5 County (Dem), Congressional District (Rep)
39 North Carolina 60.2 Congressional District
40 New Hampshire 59.3 County
41 North Dakota 55.9 Legislative District
42 Kentucky 55.8 Congressional District
43 Alabama 55.4 Congressional District
44 Montana 54.1 County
45 Arkansas 52.5 Congressional District
46 South Dakota 51.9 County
47 Mississippi 48.8 County
48 West Virginia 46.1 Congressional District
49 Maine 40.2 Congressional District
50 Vermont 38.2 County
source: US Census Bureau  
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Intra-party Homogeneity 
 Given that each state has its own political characteristics and political and 
electoral characteristics and needs that the political parties in that state aim to meet, state 
political parties differ—sometimes greatly—from their counterparts in other states and on 
the national level.  However, parties can also vary greatly within states as well.  The 
intra-party homogeneity of a particular political party may influence its use of one 
hierarchical structure over another as a very homogenous state party may have very 
different organizational needs than a less homogenous state party.  A less homogenous 
state party likely has various regional, geographic, demographic and other organizational 
needs which would presumably lead a less homogenous state party to utilize a more local 
organizational structure.   
 Starting with their 1984 article The Polarization of American Politics Keith T. 
Poole and Howard Rosenthal have used a scaling method known as NOMINATE 
(Nominal Three-Step Estimation) to analyze choice and preferential data of members of 
congress.  Through the years they have refined and adapted their methods to allow for 
comparisons of the ideological scores of members of congress from different time 
periods.  Today, DW-NOMINATE (dynamic, weighted, NOMINATE) scores for 
members of the US Congress “are widely used measures of legislators’ ideological 
locations over time” (Poole et al, 2008, 2).  Using the DW-NOMINATE scores for each 
member of the US House and Senate from the 111
th
 Congress I was able to calculate the 
standard deviation for the DW-NOMINATE scores for the congressional delegation from 
each party from each state.  A lower standard deviation would indicate party caucus 
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members from the particular state would be clumped more closely together and therefore 
an indication of greater intra-party homogeneity within the state party.  
 When comparing the standard deviation of the DW-NOMINATE scores for each 
state’s congressional delegation by party as a measure of intra-party homogeneity, there 
doesn’t appear to be any significant correlation between intra-party homogeneity and the 
model of hierarchical organizational structure utilized by that state party.  This may 
indicate that intra-party homogeneity does not impact a state party’s organizational 
structure model.  However, it may also merely be an indication that the standard 
deviation of congressional DW-NOMINATE scores is an insufficient measure of intra-
party homogeneity as the number of elected members of the House and Senate is 
relatively.  For the standard deviation scores by state for Democrats seven states were 
unable to produce scores as there were zero or one Democrat members of Congress in 
that state.  For Republicans fifteen states were unable to yield scores for this reason.   
With such a large number of state parties excluded from analysis because of 
insufficient members of Congress, it may prevent the analysis from yielding any 
significant correlations.  Perhaps if a DW-NOMINATE type score were available for 
state legislatures and governors as well as members of congress we would be able to have 
a larger sampling of elected officials with which to calculate this measure of intra-party 
homogeneity.  As it stands, using DW-NOMINATE scores and the standard deviation of 
these for each party in each state produces no indication that intra-party homogeneity 
leads a state party to favor one model of organizational structure over another.   
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Rank State Democrat Std Deviation Organizational Structure
1 Louisiana 0.000707107 Congressional District
2 North Dakota 0.021 Legislative District
3 Nevada 0.02532456 County
4 South Dakota 0.033234019 County
5 Montana 0.03959798 County
6 New Hampshire 0.040869712 County
7 Rhode Island 0.049685679 City/Town
8 Arkansas 0.051036262 Congressional District
9 Iowa 0.065895751 Congressional District
10 Connecticut 0.072411785 Congressional District
11 Massachusetts 0.073723223 Town/City/Ward
12 Oregon 0.078874584 Congressional District
13 Vermont 0.089802561 County
14 Kentucky 0.089802561 Congressional District
15 Texas 0.090438787 County
16 Hawaii 0.096384646 County
17 Colorado 0.103745568 Congressional District
18 Pennsylvania 0.107112669 County
19 Tennessee 0.112859647 County
20 California 0.12678248 County
21 Virginia 0.126844956 Congressional District
22 New York 0.127378369 County
23 Florida 0.12762525 County
24 Michigan 0.130640686 Congressional District
25 Wisconsin 0.132686885 Congressional District
26 New Mexico 0.132940588 County
27 Washington 0.133241993 County
28 New Jersey 0.139657745 County
29 Illinois 0.142715135 County
30 North Carolina 0.143954082 Congressional District
31 Ohio 0.145256576 County
32 Maryland 0.152589409 County
33 South Carolina 0.153442172 County
34 Maine 0.154149278 Congressional District
35 Alabama 0.159315201 Congressional District
36 Indiana 0.166495345 Congressional District
37 Missouri 0.16853427 Congressional District
38 Delaware 0.171822583 County/City/Region Hybrid
39 Minnesota 0.179541082 Congressional District
40 Georgia 0.197866369 Congressional District
41 West Virginia 0.211291663 Congressional District
42 Arizona 0.240011458 County
43 Mississippi 0.286087982 County
44 Alaska * Legislative District
45 Kansas * County
46 Wyoming * Congressional District
47 Idaho * Congressional District
48 Nebraska * Congressional District
49 Oklahoma * County
50 Utah * County
* indicates 0 or 1 members of Congress from party  
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Rank State Republican Std Deviation Organizational Structure
1 Maine 0.016263456 Congressional District
2 Alaska 0.026162951 Legislative District
3 Kansas 0.040203234 Congressional District
4 Nevada 0.050204581 County
5 Alabama 0.054612052 Congressional District
6 Michigan 0.077789092 Congressional District
7 Kentucky 0.077942073 Congressional District
8 Wyoming 0.082615576 County
9 Idaho 0.08580404 County
10 Mississippi 0.095028066 County
11 Nebraska 0.096410148 Congressional District
12 Virginia 0.102823635 Congressional District
13 Florida 0.111064601 County
14 New York 0.111574713 County
15 South Carolina 0.112119579 Congressional District
16 Tennessee 0.112565388 County
17 Minnesota 0.113465119 Congressional District
18 Illinois 0.113900332 County
19 North Carolina 0.120110643 Congressional District
20 Colorado 0.120208153 County
21 California 0.121764008 County
22 Texas 0.124665379 County
23 Missouri 0.128320562 Congressional District
24 Louisiana 0.146787667 County
25 Washington 0.14762904
26 Wisconsin 0.148108069 Congressional District
27 Ohio 0.149136682 County
28 Pennsylvania 0.150487244 County
29 Oklahoma 0.151888665 Congressional District
30 Utah 0.164884556 County
31 Georgia 0.165003165 Congressional District
32 Indiana 0.188341622 Congressional District
33 Iowa 0.192546964 Congressional District
34 New Jersey 0.218134591 County
35 Arizona 0.231399438 County
36 Arkansas * Congressional District
37 Connecticut * Congressional District
38 Delaware * County/City/Region Hybrid
39 Hawaii * County
40 Maryland * County
41 Massachusetts * Town/City/Ward
42 Montana * County
43 New Hampshire * County
44 New Mexico * County
45 North Dakota * Legislative District
46 Oregon * Congressional District
47 Rhode Island * City/Town
48 South Dakota * County
49 Vermont * County
50 West Virginia * Congressional District
* indicates 0 or 1 members of Congress from party  
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Regional Influences 
 Instead of looking at states singularly based on their characteristics, perhaps there 
is a regional influence in influencing the model utilized by state parties.  Using the 
standard regions used by the US Census we see that there is a pretty heavy distinction 
between the Western region’s heavy use of the county model and the nearby Midwestern 
region’s popularization of the congressional district model.  The South region appears to 
be the most diverse with both the congressional district and county models being used by 
multiple states each.  The region also contains two states in which the Democratic and 
Republican parties differ in their organizational models—more than any other region.  
The Northeast region has five states that use the county model, two that use the 
congressional district model, and two states that use neither of those models but instead 
use some other more local units for its decentralization from the state party.  
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Electoral Success 
 I have heretofore evaluated some potential causal indicators that might represent 
particular circumstances in which maintaining an intermediary organization at the 
congressional district level might make more sense, or less sense, for a given state party 
organization.  The central question boils down to this: why do state parties choose to 
organize and maintain this intermediary organizational structure? The simple response to 
this question that is consistent with all of the literature and theory surrounding parties is 
simply that state parties feel that having an intermediary structure will help them achieve 
greater electoral success given the limited precious resources state parties have at their 
disposal.   
In order to test this idea that an intermediary organization impacts electoral 
success I performed a two-stage least squares regression using percent of the two party 
vote received by the Democratic candidate as the dependent variable.  The presence of a 
Democratic and Republican intermediary structure was coded for each party in each state.  
I controlled for incumbency, the presence of a quality challenger, candidate spending, 
and demographic information such as median age, percentage of Black and Hispanic 
voters, percentage of the population in urban areas, and the unemployment rate using data 
from the 2002, 2004, and 2006 congressional elections.  I obtained most of this data from 
the data set shared with me by Damon Cann that was used in the Basinger, Cann, and 
Ensley (2012) paper “Voter Response to Congressional Campaigns: New Techniques for 
Analyzing Aggregate Electoral Behavior”.  At large congressional district states were 
dropped from the calculations because, while it can be argued that the state party 
organization is the organization that oversees the entire congressional district, the absence 
of an intermediary congressional district organization tasked with specific care of the 
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district itself and not the state as a whole makes these states too difficult to compare to 
other multi-district states that either do or do not have an intermediary organization.   
The results showed no statistically significant impact of an intermediary 
congressional district organizational structure on a state party’s percentage of the two-
party vote.  If the presence of an intermediary congressional district organization does not 
have a direct impact on the electoral outcomes for the state party it is necessary to explore 
why state parties still utilize this congressional district organizational model. 
Counteractive Effects 
 One potential explanation is that an intermediary congressional district 
organization does have an impact on electoral success, but that this impact is not manifest 
in the statistical examination because of the counteractive effects of the vast majority of 
state parties utilizing the same organizational model as the opposing party within the 
same state.  Therefore it is possible that an intermediary congressional district 
organization does indeed facilitate greater electoral outcomes for these state parties but 
that both parties enjoy these benefits and thus it isn’t shown in the two-party vote because 
any electoral benefit enjoyed from the presence of such an organization would be 
cancelled out by the benefit also being applied to the opposition party. 
Indirect Effects 
 Another possible explanation is that while the intermediary organization doesn’t 
have a direct impact on the electoral outcomes between the two parties, the presence of 
an intermediary congressional district organization could offer a state party numerous 
indirect benefits that do not directly impact electoral success but work to otherwise make 
things easier for the state party itself.  Coleman (1996) argues that political parties can 
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make organizational changes that improve a party’s strength in the eyes of scholars but 
“the final point is that in a democratic polity the status of political parties ultimately boils 
down to the public” (“Resurgent or Just Busy? Party Organizations in Contemporary 
America,”1996, p.382).  It is possible that if benefits of congressional district level party 
organizations do provide benefits, that these benefits do not reach voters and therefore 
don’t directly impact electoral outcomes.   If it is true that the presence of an intermediary 
organization has no direct impact on voters and electoral success, perhaps state parties 
still feel benefits from an alleviated burden and a lessened workload thanks to an 
intermediary organization providing further organization, logistical support, and division 
of the party’s responsibilities and workload.  The added structure within the party 
framework also provides an additional set of eyes and ears that could help to monitor 
political sentiments, recognize and recruit talented volunteers and future party candidates, 
develop relationships with donors, and other beneficial activities.  Such indirect benefits 
would explain why parties go to the effort to maintain this intermediate organization 
when they provide no direct benefit in electoral competitiveness.  
Party Farm Team 
 In sports a farm team or farm system is a team or organization that is used to 
develop the talent and to provide experience and training for the young players before 
they are ready for the “big leagues” or the main team or organization.  This structure is 
often used as a metaphor in business and other organizations that use a similar model to 
develop young talent into future leaders.  Applying this metaphor to political candidates 
is not new.  Herrnson (1994) argues that political parties are increasingly treating 
congressional staff positions as a farm system for developing individuals for their future 
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candidate pools.  Similarly, Farmer (2002) discusses the impacts of term limits in state 
legislatures on parties’ farming and developing candidates for the increased number of 
open seats caused by term limits.  Perhaps the statistically electorally unnecessary 
intermediate congressional organization works in the same manner acting as a farm team 
for the state party as a whole to provide leadership experience and training with party 
responsibilities for the party’s future leaders and candidates for elected office.  This 
intermediary organization provides another level within the party framework for future 
leaders and candidates to gain experience and maintain involvement within the party and 
is therefore seen as beneficial to the state party despite its lack of direct electoral impact. 
 This element of an intermediate congressional district organization ties back into 
Roscoe and Jenkins’ “scrappy fighter hypothesis” wherein disadvantaged parties scrap 
and claw their way to relevance.  The modern Utah Democratic Party perfectly fits the 
mold of this scrappy fighter and if there were ever a case for a party making changes to 
give it any greater potential for electoral success it would be the Utah Democratic Party.  
I argue that for these scrappy fighter state parties, a change to a congressional district 
organizational model would be of great worth if for no other reason than it increases the 
scope of the party farm team for grooming party leaders and party candidates.  These 
scrappy fighters need all of the help they can get and this increased opportunity for 
greater candidate recruitment and experience for party leadership should not be 
overlooked. 
Elite Interviews 
 In an effort to gain more qualitative information to provide greater understanding 
to this study of party hierarchical organization below the state level as well as potentially 
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gain any insight into any chicken-and-egg problems I conducted a survey of local party 
elites.  To begin this process I obtained the email information for all county and 
congressional district chairs and vice chairs that state parties would provide.  Some state 
parties would only provide telephone and mailing addresses for their local party leaders 
choosing to keep their email addresses private for internal party communications only.  
Other parties shared the email addresses of their county committees but not the email 
addresses of their congressional district committees.  Neither party in Louisiana provided 
information for their parish party chairs while Democrats and Republicans alike in 
Massachusetts didn’t share local town or ward chair email information.  The Washington 
Republican party was, again, absent in providing any information about party officials 
and was therefore not included in the sample. 
 After having obtained all email contact information for as many local party chairs 
as possible it was assembled into a list by party and by state.  To minimize bias in 
selecting a narrow subset of this entire list of contacts, I used a random number generator 
to select elites for my sample in each state.  This process of random selection resulted in a 
list of 188 email address for local party elites—two from each party from each state that 
provided email information for its local party leaders.  Using this list of 188 I compiled a 
short email that with the intention of gaining substantive qualitative information—while 
being short enough that it didn’t discourage participation—and also with the aim of 
identifying local party elites that would be willing to participate in a more lengthy 
interview regarding party hierarchical structure models and their impacts.  Eight of the 
emails immediately were returned by the mail system as undeliverable—a circumstance I 
anticipated knowing full well from first hand experience in interning with a state party 
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that, while parties may have been helpful in providing me this contact information, the 
parties own records and lists are not always kept up to date and accurate.  The eight 
undeliverable emails left me with a potential pool of 180 local party elites which were 
asked the following questions: 
 
1) What is the party structure in your state? (is there a Congressional 
District level committee/party organization or does it break down from 
state to county?) Also, do you know why your state party chose the 
structure it chose rather than a different structure?  
2) What is the division of work distribution and responsibility between the 
State, Congressional District, and County/local organizations?  
3) In your first hand experience as a local party leader, what benefits did 
you see as a result of your particular party structure and division of 
responsibility? 
   Any disadvantages? (ie competing with another level of the party 
structure for volunteers, fundraising, etc?) 
 
Having already discussed several potential causes that could have induced a party to 
organize with one structure or another, I asked local party elites whether they knew why 
their state party chose the structure that it did.  One chair of a congressional district 
organization responded “I do not know the reason nor history for this structure” and a 
county chair from a different state echoed that sentiment in responding “I don't know 
why the state party originally chose the structure”.  In total, 8 of the 11 responses I 
received from local party leaders answered in some variation of “I don’t know” why their 
state party utilizes the organizational model that it does—the remaining three respondents 
didn’t answer that portion of the question at all.  
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 Responses to the remaining questions posed to these local party elites appear to 
support the indirect benefits explanation of why parties choose to have an intermediary 
organization to divide up the overall party workload and organizational burden.  
Numerous respondents mentioned that a congressional district organization focused more 
on organizational and bureaucratic functions allowing the county level parties to focus 
more on grassroots movements, voter outreach, and GOTV efforts.  Many respondents 
went to great lengths to indicate that while the congressional district and county 
organizations often work closely together, they each have their own responsibilities and 
functions which would support the division of the workload component previously 
discussed as an indirect benefit of an intermediary organization for a state party.   
A party leader from Georgia provided a response that seems to support this 
“indirect benefits” explanation by dividing up the workload, but also a response that 
supports the explanation concerning identifying and developing future party candidates 
and leaders: “County parties are the ‘grass roots’ that get [our party’s] voters involved 
and, by recruiting and encouraging candidates for local (county and municipal) offices, 
and together with the Congressional District committees develop the ‘farm team’ for 
higher offices (state legislature, state-wide offices, U.S. House and Senate).”  While 
previous research by other scholars has clearly shown that local party elites are not 
always the most informed on issues, and while the sample size and response rate are not 
of the highest quality, these responses from local party elites at least seem to show that in 
their real life, first hand experiences within party structures there are at least some non-
electorally based indirect benefits of intermediary congressional district organizations.   
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Conclusion 
 Despite the increasing influence of Super PACs and other independent 
organizations the health and vibrancy of our political and electoral system is still greatly 
affected by the competitiveness and efficiency of the major parties in our two-party 
system.  Therefore the question of whether the hierarchical organizational structures of 
state political parties influence electoral outcomes is an important topic of study.  After 
summarizing the various ways in which state parties across the country organize 
themselves hierarchically, I explored several factors that might lead a state party to have 
an intermediary congressional district organization including state size, population, 
number of counties, level of urbanization of the population, intraparty homogeneity, and 
regional trends.  The larger a state’s geographic size and the larger percentage of it’s 
population in urban areas both increase the likelihood that political parties in that state 
will utilize a county organizational model.  State’s in the middle third of rankings in both 
geographic size and population show a strong tendency towards having parties that use 
the congressional district organizational model.  Further, the greater number of counties 
in a given state the greater the likelihood that the parties in that state will utilize the 
congressional district model.  Intra-party homogeneity calculated using the standard 
deviation of DW-NOMINATE scores indicated no correlation between organizational 
structure and a party’s intra-party homogeneity.     
I then used a two-stage least squares regression to test the impact of the presence 
of an intermediary congressional district organization on the percentage of the two party 
vote that the party receives in US House races over three elections.  The results showed 
that there was no statistically significant relationship between organizational structure 
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model utilized by a state party and that party’s percentage of the vote received in House 
races.      
Possible Directions for Future Study 
While the statistical analyses didn’t show any statistically significant relationship 
between the presence of an intermediary organization and the percentage of the two party 
vote in US House races, future study could investigate whether the presence of such an 
organization has an impact on other factors such as the number of uncontested seats—
both in US House races as well as state legislative races as the presence of an 
intermediary organization has been hypothesized to improve a party’s ability to recruit 
candidates.  Future study could also, after controlling for certain factors such as 
partisanship, competiveness, and demographic characteristics, examine whether the 
presence of an intermediary organization has an impact on voter turnout—following the 
hypothesis that the division of the party workload with a congressional district 
organization allows a county party to focus even more of its energy on grassroots voter 
outreach.  Another avenue for future study could use the county versus congressional 
district models as the independent variable rather than the dependent variable to examine 
how the other electoral factors relate to the models in that way.  Including population 
disparity between counties within the state would be another factor to examine as a 
potential factor for parties choosing one model over another.  This would be interesting 
analysis for states like Utah where there are counties of only a couple thousand people 
and other counties with half a million to a million residents.   
This further research may, like my examination of the relationship between an 
intermediary organization and the percentage of the vote in House races, prove to show 
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nothing statistically significant, but the impact—or irrelevance—of party organizational 
structures on our electoral system is a relevant and potentially meaningful subject with 
several possibilities in which it can be examined further.  
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Party Document Sources 
 
State  
Alabama Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://aldemocrats.org/images/uploads/SDEC_Bylaws.pdf 
Rep http://algop.org/sites/default/files/Bylaws%208.13.11.pdf 
Alaska State House Districts 
Dem http://www.alaskademocrats.org/images/documents/adpplan2010.pdf 
Rep http://alaskarepublicans.com/about-the-arp/party-rules/ 
Arizona County 
Dem http://azdem.org/assets/ADP_Bylaws_10.25.11.pdf 
Rep http://www.azgop.org/azgop-leadership/county-leadership 
Arkansas Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://arkdems.integritystl.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/2010-2012-Rules-of-the-Party.pdf 
Rep http://www.arkansasgop.org/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=38e6644b-ab94-4492-bb13-b61bb34a0842 
California County 
Dem http://www.cadem.org/admin/miscdocs/files/CDP-BY-LAWS.pdf 
Rep http://www.cagop.org/userfiles/file/Standing%20Rules%20and%20Bylaws%2003-20-2011.pdf 
Colorado Congressional District-->County (Dem), County (Rep) 
Dem http://coloradodems.org/docs/CDPRules.PDF 
Rep Email 
Connecticut Congressional Dist, State Senate 
Dem email 
Rep https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=gmail&attid=0.2&thid=134c449b89dbba4f&mt=application/msword&url=https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui%3D2%26ik%3D85ee320dbe%26view%3Datt%26th%3D134c449b89dbba4f%26attid%3D0.2%26disp%3Dsafe%26zw&sig=AHIEtbSL7IRWU7q20qj_GaY3YfjaqcEPzA 
Delaware City of Wilmington, New Castle County, Kent County, sussex county 
Dem http://www.deldems.org/about-us/local-party-structure/ 
Rep http://www.delawaregop.com/regional.aspx 
Florida County 
Dem http://www.fladems.com/pages/county-organizations 
Rep http://rpof.org/contact-us/find-your-local-rec/ 
Georgia Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://www.georgiademocrat.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/dpg_operations+organization.pdf 
Rep http://www.gagop.org/local/ 
Hawaii County 
Dem http://www.hawaiidemocrats.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=115:hawaii-democratic-party-constitution&catid=44:constitution&Itemid=167 
Rep http://www.gophawaii.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/HRP-Rules-2011.pdf 
Idaho County 
Dem http://idahodems.org/about/structure-of-the-idaho-democratic-party/ 
Rep http://idgop.org/idgop-rules-4/ 
Illinois County 
Dem http://www.ildems.com/Resources.htm 
Rep http://www.weareillinois.org/learn/counties.aspx 
Indiana Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://indems.3cdn.net/923e40d47e778c6f35_1ym6i6tin.pdf 
Rep http://www.indgop.org/ContentFiles/80/2011-2012%20State%20Committee%20Rules.pdf 
Iowa Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://iowademocrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/2010constitution.pdf 
Rep http://iowagop.org/constitution.php 
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Kansas Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://www.ksdp.org/sites/default/files/KDPBylaws09.pdf 
Rep http://ksgop.org/kansas-republican-party-constitution-2/ 
Kentucky Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://kydemocrat.com/bylaws.pdf 
Rep http://rpk.org/rpk-rules/ 
Louisiana  Congressional District-->Parish (Dem), County (Rep) 
Dem http://www.lademo.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/463186 
Rep http://lagop.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/RSCC-bylaws-5-21-111.pdf 
Maine Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://www.mainedems.org/assets/files/Rules%20-%207.25.11.pdf 
Rep http://www.mainegop.com/about-2/rules-and-by-laws/ 
Maryland County 
Dem http://www.mddems.org/your-party/party-by-laws 
Rep http://www.mdgop.org/local-gop/ 
Mass Town/Ward/City 
Dem http://www.massdems.org/your-party/governance/charter/ 
Rep http://www.massgop.com/extras/MRSC%20Bylaws%20111708%20_2_.pdf 
Michigan Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://www.michigandems.com/page/local-parties.html 
Rep http://www.migop.org/index.php/about/principles/ 
Minnesota Congressional District-->local unit 
Dem http://dfl.org/sites/dfl.org/files/Minnesota%20DFL%20Party%20Constitution.pdf 
Rep http://www.mngop.com/pdfs/constitution.pdf 
Mississippi County 
Dem http://www.mississippidemocrats.org/ 
Rep http://msgop.org/ 
Missouri Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://missouridems.org/constitution 
Rep http://www.mogop.org/resources/mo-gop/ 
Montana County 
Dem http://www.montanademocrats.org/county_committees 
Rep http://www.mtgop.org/rules.aspx 
Nebraska Congressional District-->County 
Dem https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=explorer&chrome=true&srcid=0B9SnVd9DaAPFMTNlODU3NWItYzNiYy00ZDIwLWFmZWYtY2ZlYWEwNmU2YjA0&hl=en 
Rep http://negop.org/about/constitution/ 
Nevada County 
Dem http://nvdems.3cdn.net/30ef8e4d06b9341612_67m6b98x2.pdf 
Rep http://www.nevadagop.org/about-the-gop/by-laws/ 
New Hampshire County 
Dem http://www.nhdp.org/free_details.asp?id=71 
Rep http://www.nhgop.org/pages/detail/33 
New Jersey County 
Dem http://njdems.org/index.php/party/ 
Rep http://www.njgop.org/about 
New Mexico County 
Dem http://www.nmdemocrats.org/party/rules 
Rep http://gopnm.com/uploads/FileLinks/a693d714db594c2a95c61140fe1bfdbd/RPNM%20Rules.pdf 
New York County 
Dem http://www.nydems.org/local 
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Rep http://www.nygop.org/page/our-republican-leadership-team 
North Carolina Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://ncdems.3cdn.net/478a1e2aef2c165d30_ohm6i26tg.pdf 
Rep http://03481cf.netsolhost.com/WordPress/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/2011-NCGOP-Plan-of-Organization.pdf 
North Dakota  Legislative District 
Dem http://www.demnpl.com/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC={267E1C81-28FE-4574-B9E2-065A875E7421} 
Rep http://www.northdakotagop.org/about/district-chairs/ 
Ohio County 
Dem http://ohiodems.org/about/bylaws/ 
Rep http://www.ohiogop.org/index.php/local/ 
Oklahoma Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://www.okdemocrats.org/Websites/okdemocrats/Images/ODP%20Constitution%20and%20By-Laws%20-%202008%20Updated%20Version.pdf 
Rep http://www.okgop.com/pdfs/ORP%20RULES%202010.PDF 
Oregon Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://www.dpo.org/party 
Rep http://www.oregonrepublicanparty.org/sites/default/files/ORP_Updated_Bylaws-Adopted_May_21_2011.pdf 
Pennsylvania County 
Dem http://www.padems.com/about/bylaws 
Rep http://www.pagop.org/about/ 
Rhode Island  City/town 
Dem http://www.ridemocrats.org/about-the-party/party-by-laws.html 
Rep Email 
South Carolina County (Dem), Congressional DistCounty (Rep) 
Dem http://www.scdp.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/PartyRules.pdf 
Rep http://www.scgop.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/SCGOP-Rules.pdf 
South Dakota County 
Dem http://www.sddp.org/what-we-stand-for/ 
Rep http://southdakotagop.com/pdf/SDGOP_BYLAWS.PDF 
Tennessee County 
Dem http://www.tndp.org/page/county-party 
Rep http://www.tngop.org/county.html 
Texas County 
Dem http://www.txdemocrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/TDPRules-2010-2012.pdf 
Rep http://www.texasgop.org/party-structure 
Utah County 
Dem http://www.utahdemocrats.org/documents/usdcbylawsconst.pdf 
Rep http://www.utgop.org/pdf/Utah%20Republican%20Party%20Constitution.pdf 
Vermont County 
Dem http://www.vtdemocrats.org/our-party/bylaws 
Rep http://vtgop.org/about-2/ 
Virginia Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://www.vademocrats.org/sites/va-dems-v2.vanwebhost.com/files/DPV%20Party%20Plan%202010.pdf 
Rep http://www.rpv.org/sites/default/files/Party%20Plan%20Amended%20November%202010%20without%20notes.pdf 
Washington Leg dist/County 
Dem http://www.wa-democrats.org/content/party-structure 
Rep N/A 
West Virginia Congressional District-->County 
Dem http://wvdemocrats.com/documents/DemPartyRulesasamended12-8-07.pdf 
Rep http://wvgop.org/about/wvgop-by-laws/ 
Wisconsin Congressional District-->County 
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Dem http://www.wisdems.org/about/county_parties 
Rep http://www.wisgop.org/constitution-republican-party-wisconsin 
Wyoming County 
Dem 
Rep 
http://www.wyomingdemocrats.com/ht/d/Committees/committeeLevel/3/pid/273348 
http://actnow.gop.com/states/WY/pdf/101617%20BYLAWS.PDF 
 
 
